$LUNC gained 25% in 24 hours. The crypto market, meanwhile, lost 2.4% over the same period (CoinCodex, this morning).
The funniest part? This month's âbad newsâ for Terra Classic changed nothing. Binance didn't do its November burn, a first since March 2023.
Two figures side by side.
Binance's last burn, on October 1: 334.88 million LUNC destroyed. Sounds huge. That's 0.006% of the ~5,500 billion in circulation. At today's price ($0.000049), about $16,000.
Yesterday's rise: roughly, an extra fifty million dollars in market cap in a single day.
So the missing burn weighs more than 3,000 times less than a single day of speculation.
(A burn means sending tokens to an address for which nobody has the key: they leave circulation forever.)
Why the delay? According to Lunc Daily, LUNC withdrawals have still been suspended on Binance since the $6.3 billion hack in late October, so the exchange can't send the tokens to the burn address. No suspension of the program has been announced.
Another sobering figure: Binance accounts for only about 19% of the LUNC burned since the start. The rest comes from community burns and the 1.5% on-chain transaction tax (Cryptopolitan).
My take: the burn is a symbol of support, not a price driver. What moves $LUNC is attention. And a 25% green candle on a token that lost more than 99.99% in 2022 can just as quickly head in the other direction.
On a scale of 0 to 10, how much weight do you give burns in LUNC's price?
The 12th word in your secret phrase isnât arbitrary (I tested all 2,048)
This afternoon, I wrote twenty lines of Python to answer a silly question: if I keep 11 words from a recovery phrase and choose the 12th at random from the official list, how often will the wallet accept it? The BIP39 list (the standard published in 2013, used by most wallets $BTC and $SOL ) contains 2,048 words. My intuition said: any word would work. After all, theyâre words. Experiment result: 128 out of 2,048. One in sixteen. Why? Because the last word isn't entirely ârandom.â A 12-word phrase is 132 bits. 128 bits are pure randomnessâthe actual key. The last 4 bits are a checksum: a small fingerprint calculated from the other 128 (using the SHA-256 hash function). A checksum is like the two-digit check key at the end of a bank account number: it contains no new information; itâs used to verify that the rest was copied correctly.
This receipt has become evidence. On November 15, its owner reports that about 1,300 $SOL had left his wallet. The next day, he opens the device: an extra circuit board, connected to an antenna stuck beneath the cover. The registry maintained by Mark KarpelĂšs (former head of Mt. Gox) lists the implant as confirmed.
The troubling detail: Virgin Megastore is one of Ledger's authorized retailers in the UAE. Not a Telegram seller. A mall store.
Two other cases, with a grain of salt: - a Ledger Stax bought at the same place on October 11, 507,000 $USDT drained on November 14. Implant suspected; the device is with a lab; - a Ledger Flex from MediaMarkt Berlin, with more than $320,000 reportedly lost. Nothing verified so far.
Ledger says it has âno indicationâ that its systems were compromised. That may be true and still solve nothing: an implant is a bug slipped into the casing between the factory and the customer. Not into the servers.
My take: âbuy from an official storeâ is still good advice, but it's no longer a guarantee. The shortest supply chain is from the manufacturer's website to your door. And with a new wallet, I test it first with a small amount.
Where we are, these devices often arrive in the suitcase of someone returning from Dubai or through an online reseller. The question is no longer just âis it genuine?â but âhow many hands has it passed through?â
Bought a Ledger or Trezor from these stores in recent months? KarpelĂšs advises checking the device or moving the funds.
Could you trace the journey your hardware wallet took to reach you?
21 million bitcoins? I read the 5 lines of code that make the promise
Nobody wrote â21,000,000â into the rule that creates new $BTC . Look for that number in the function that sets the minersâ reward: it isnât there. The cap is a consequence, not a constant. And for five years, it even depended on a shaky quirk of the C++ language. Hereâs the function as it exists today in Bitcoin Core (GetBlockSubsidy). Five lines. Letâs read them one by one. Line 1 â halvings = block height / 210,000 âHeightâ means the block number. Every 210,000 blocks (about 4 years, at one block every ~10 minutes), this counter goes up by 1. Weâre around block 976,500: divide that by 210,000 and you get 4. Four halvings have passed; the most recent was in April 2024.
âA quantum computer could drain 35% of bitcoin in an hour.â
This phrase has been circulating since yesterday. It combines two true figures and makes up a false one.
True #1: according to Glassnode (November 10), 35.4% of the $BTC supply, or around 7.12 million BTC, sits in addresses whose public key is already visible on the blockchain. A public key is like a lock that anyone can study. No computer today can work backwards from it to find the private key. A very large quantum machine theoretically could.
True #2: Jameson Lopp (Casa) ran the numbers as a thought experiment. Around 35,000 exposed keys, mostly belonging to coins that have been untouched for ~15 years, hold some 2.26 million BTC. At one key cracked per hour, it would take around 4 years to crack them all. At one per day: 96 years. At 10 minutes per key: 243 days.
âOne hourâ is therefore the time per key in a hypothetical scenario. Not the time it would take to crack a third of the network. And Lopp has already said he sees a greater than 50% chance that such a machine is more than ten years away.
My take: the real issue isnât when, but who is exposed. According to Glassnode, 25.8% of the supply is exposed because of address reuse: you spend from an address, its public key becomes visible, and you keep receiving funds at that address. Most wallets offer a new address for each incoming payment. You just have to accept it.
The coins that can never be protected are the ones no one can move anymore. Thatâs where the debate will get heated, not over a well-managed wallet.
Do you still receive funds at the same address, or do you let your wallet change it?
True or false: on an official website, with the https padlock, the crypto address you copy is guaranteed to be the right one.
False. And November 16 proved it on a large scale.
That day, an attacker exploited a vulnerability at Optimizely, a tool major brands use to test their pages. They slipped code into the projects of 178 organizations (identified by researcher Scott Helme). Among them: Ledger, CNN, BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC Insurance.
The script was served by Optimizelyâs own CDN, with its certificate. To your browser, everything looked normal.
What it did: monitor the page, detect wallet addresses (ETH, TRX, BTC, TON, SOL, LTC, DOGE...) and replace them with the attackerâs. Valid addresses that pass format checks. It also stole bank card details.
Known tally so far: about $7,000 received in their wallets by November 16, according to Helme; some were already active beforehand. Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability; everything was clean that same evening.
$7,000 isnât much. In my view, the lesson is worth a lot more. The padlock protects the connection between you and the website, not what the website loads itself. Your only real defense is the confirmation screen in your wallet or on the exchange.
Three ten-second habits: - compare the beginning, the end AND a few characters in the middle (clipboard hijackers often copy the beginning and end); - save frequently used addresses in an address book / whitelist; - for a large amount, send a small test transaction first.
This applies to $TRX or USDT on Tron just as much as to $ETH .
Do you check your address character by character, or do you trust copy and paste?
A Letter to the Man Who Paid 10,000 Bitcoins for Two Pizzas
Dear Laszlo, Every May 22, millions of people poke a little fun at you. On May 22, 2010, you paid for two Papa John's pizzas with 10,000 bitcoins. At today's rate (around $BTC $64,000), that's about $640 million. Two pizzas. I wanted to write to tell you something that gets forgotten in the jokes: you didn't miss out on anything. You did the work nobody else wanted to do. A quick recap. A few days earlier, you'd posted a simple offer on the Bitcointalk forum: 10,000 bitcoins for two large pizzas. For days, nothing. Nobody wanted them, because nobody knew what a bitcoin was worth. Then another forum member accepted, ordered the pizzas remotely, and had them delivered to you. It's considered the first known purchase of a real-world item paid for in bitcoin.
Two years ago, a crypto strategy paid 20 to 40% a year without betting on prices going up. Today, it yields about as much as a U.S. Treasury bill.
Its name: the basis trade. The idea: I buy bitcoin and, at the same time, short it using a perpetual contract (a futures contract with no expiration date). If the price rises, I gain on one side and lose on the other. What remains is the âfundingâ: a small fee that leveraged buyers regularly pay to sellers, as long as they outnumber them and are more eager to buy.
The figures, according to a Talos report cited by CoinDesk this morning: - early 2024: 20 to 40% a year - 2026: around 3 to 5%, with even a period of negative returns in the second quarter - equity-backed perps: around 11% a year on average for the 10 largest, versus around 3% for major crypto contracts
The money followed. Perps tied to real-world assets (mostly stocks) have more than $11 billion in open interest, about 18% of the market, split mostly between Binance and Hyperliquid.
My takeaway: this yield was never a gift from the market. It was the price of other peopleâs impatience. In 2024, many borrowed to buy bitcoin and were willing to pay dearly. With BTC stagnating around $65,000, those impatient buyers are few and far between, and the premium is fading along with them. It has moved to where the excitement is now: stocks.
Practical corollary: if someone offers you a âstable 30% yieldâ on bitcoin in 2026, ask whoâs paying. The market isnât paying that anymore.
$BTC $BNB
Do you see this calm in funding as a bottom forming, or just fatigue?
If I die tomorrow, will my family be able to recover my crypto?
Awkward question, but Iâd rather ask it now: if you disappeared tomorrow, who in your family would know you have crypto? And among them, who would know how to recover it? For many of us, the honest answer is âno one.â We keep it discreet, sometimes even from our spouse. Thatâs understandable. But crypto without the right information is a locked door whose key went with you. The story everyone cites in this context is QuadrigaCX, a Canadian platform. December 2018: its founder, Gerald Cotten, dies in India. The platform then explains that he alone controlled the wallets where customersâ funds were stored. For months, people told it as the tragedy of the lost keys.
âA farmer paid before the harvest season ends.â
That was the image chosen yesterday by Ajay Banga, president of the World Bank, to present a project with Citi and Circle: exploring the $USDC to disburse development funds.
I read the November 17 press release in full. Three phrases caught my attention.
âExplore.â The word appears everywhere. The text names no countries, no amounts, no timeline. This is at the study stage, not the payment stage.
âCorrespondent banking.â This is what the project aims to complement or improve: the chain of intermediary banks through which an international payment passes, each with its own delays and fees. Citi brings its banking connections; Circle issues and settles USDC (a stablecoin, meaning a digital token backed by the dollar).
âWhere digital assets are permitted.â At the outset, only borrower countries that authorize these assets are covered. For part of Africa, the legal question will therefore come before the technical one.
It all relies on FundsChain, the Bankâs blockchain ledger, already used by more than 350 projects in 96 countries to track where the money goes.
My take: this is a real signal, but it affects the plumbing between institutions, not yet the farmerâs pocket. Saving a few days between Washington and a ministry is good. If the money then sits for two months in an administrative process, no stablecoin will change that. The most underestimated benefit may be traceability: it mainly bothers those who profit from opacity.
For those of you who have seen project funds pass through: does the money tend to get lost before it reaches the country, or afterward?
The Solana Foundation has acquired a majority stake in CoinGecko, the site where countless people check a tokenâs price before doing anything else. The announcement was made at Breakpoint in London. The price paid and exact percentage were not disclosed (CoinDesk, Nov. 17).
Whatâs being highlighted: 18 million registered users, and market data supplied to 180,000 apps and businesses through its API (the pipeline other services use to retrieve these prices automatically).
Solanaâs plan: Solana-powered trading directly on the site, GeckoTerminal, and the app. CoinGecko speaks more cautiously of an option âunder considerationâ and promises to keep its calculation methods public.
Weâve seen this movie before. In 2020, Binance acquired CoinMarketCap. As a result, the two major price aggregators now belong to someone with something to sell. An exchange on one side, a blockchain on the other.
My take: this isnât a scandal; itâs a change in status. An independent aggregator has only one boss: its readers. An aggregator backed by an ecosystem has two. Thereâs no proof that rankings will be skewed. But the right question is no longer âIs this price fair?â Itâs âWho decides what appears first, and next to which button?â
Things to watch: which tokens make it onto the homepage, where the âtradeâ button appears, and whether the methods remain public.
Many of us open CoinGecko as a neutral reference before a P2P trade. Keeping a second source handy costs nothing.
$SOL $BNB
And you, how many sites do you check before trusting a price?
$1.29 trillion for bitcoin? That figure isn't in any vault
The figure shown this morning for bitcoin: about $1.29 trillion in market capitalization. People read it everywhere as âthe amount of money there is in $BTC .â That's wrong, and this mistake costs a lot of people dearly on small tokens. Market capitalization is just multiplication, nothing more. Last price paid Ă number of units in circulation. Here: roughly $64,150 Ă 20.11 million BTC. Nobody put that $1.29 trillion in a vault. The last buyer paid $64,150 for ONE unit, and the formula applies that price to all the others, including those that haven't moved since 2010.
Your funds were clean. You convert them into stablecoins. Now theyâre suspect.
Thatâs the reasoning attributed to Gerson Romantini, division chief at Brazilâs Central Bank, according to the outlet Livecoins. He reportedly even compared this market to the âdĂłlar-cabo,â an informal channel for moving currency out of the country. He did not respond to CoinDesk.
The context: in Brazil, stablecoins (tokens meant to be worth $1, such as $USDT) accounted for around 80% of reported crypto transaction volume last year, according to the Finance Ministry.
Immediate pushback: lawmakers are preparing a request for information in Congress, the Instituto Livre Mercado is demanding the meeting minutes, and the ABToken association says that âusing stablecoins, in itself, does not constitute money laundering.â
Brazilian law backs them up: money laundering means concealing the origin of money obtained through a crime. Itâs the origin that matters, not the pipe.
What is actually prohibited, however: since October 1 (Resolution 561), electronic foreign-exchange providers can no longer settle their international payments in crypto. The âstablecoin sandwichâ (reais â token â foreign currency) is off-limits to them. Buying or holding stablecoins remains legal.
My take: conflating the tool with the crime suits a regulator that wants to keep control of foreign exchange. By the same logic, cash would be guilty by nature. And this could be said tomorrow in Lagos or Accra, where the digital dollar often serves as a shelter from a currency thatâs melting away.
Legitimate wariness of a dollar it canât control, or a monopolist reflex: which side do you think Brazilâs Central Bank is on?
Your USDT earns you no interest. Tether, meanwhile, generated $1.5 billion in operating profit between July and September 2026. $4.5 billion over nine months. These two sentences are connected. To see how, I took the attestation published on October 30 (BDO, figures as of September 30) and read it like the label on a packet of biscuits. COMPOSITION, per $100 of reserves $72.90: U.S. Treasury bills, repurchase agreements and cash $9.97: physical gold bars
$1.2 trillion. Thatâs how much Zelle moved between Americans in 2025. Yesterday, on the Breakpoint stage, the bank-owned network (JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, Bank of AmericaâŠ) announced that its in-house stablecoin, ZelleUSD, will run on $SOL for international payments.
What was shown: â a confidential $1.25 million transfer between two banks; â an encrypted amount, invisible to the public but readable by network banks for their anti-money laundering checks; â a regulated issuer, Anchorage Digital Bank.
What wasnât shown: â real money. The demo ran on the devnet, Solanaâs test network, where tokens are worthless; â a date. The first corridor, United States â India, was announced for late 2026, but nothing was confirmed on stage; â Africa. No corridors are planned for now.
(A stablecoin is a token thatâs supposed to always be worth $1, backed by reserves.)
My take: the signal isnât technical. Not long ago, a U.S. bank sending dollars over a public blockchain would have sounded like a provocation. Today, theyâre just asking for the amounts to be hidden. Privacy thatâs available to banks but not the public: useful for compliance, but a long way from cryptoâs original promise.
And for those receiving money from abroad, the real question is still the last mile: who converts these digital dollars into cash or mobile money, and at what cost?
A public blockchain where only banks can read the amounts: progress or a step backward?
Proxima, a trading app on Solana, published its post-mortem Saturday night. The account reads like an incident log:
Nov. 3 â a log line intended for the beta starts writing private keys to the technical logs. It was never supposed to run in production. Someone switched the logs to âdebugâ mode to monitor performance. Nov. 10 â the line is removed. Except the logs are kept for 15 days in a monitoring tool (SigNoz) whose security update had been âpostponed several times.â Nov. 14, 02:16 GMT â an attacker siphons off the logs. The firewall rule that was supposed to hide this tool from the internet had been âinadvertently deleted.â 03:22 â first wallet drained. 05:42 â last one.
According to Proxima: 5 324,2 $SOL taken from 870 wallets belonging to 181 users, around 0.1% of its wallets. Everyone was reimbursed from the company treasury.
One detail is troubling: the initial estimate was $200,000 to $250,000. At SOLâs price during the attack (~$75), the total is closer to $400,000 (according to Cryptowatchdeskâs calculation). The report doesnât explain the discrepancy.
What strikes me is that none of these mistakes is particularly spectacular. A bot that buys and sells on your behalf has to keep your private key somewhere â the key is the master password that authorizes spending. Every place it passes through (a log, a server, a service provider) is one more door you canât see.
My rule: with this kind of app, only use an amount Iâm willing to lose, and never reuse elsewhere a wallet it created.
The last bot you entrusted with a wallet â could you say where it keeps your key?
Your equipment is running. Your electricity bill is running. But the bitcoins are going to someone else.
Thatâs what happened this weekend to a little over a dozen Luxor customers, a $BTC mining provider. Nobody stole the machines. Nobody switched them off. The attacker got in through Commander, the software used to monitor and configure machines remotely, and changed just one setting: the pool.
A pool is a cooperative of miners: each contributes computing power, and the rewards are shared. Switching pools means switching cash registers. The machines were redirected to OCEAN, benefiting an address identified by hosting provider CoreX.
The figure, recorded on the blockchain: 0.243 BTC received in three payments, worth about $15,700. They hadnât been spent as of Monday morning, according to CoinDesk.
The nastiest detail: at OCEAN, work already performed continues to be paid out over a rolling period. So even after the fix, money can keep flowing to the attacker. Those who said âthey didnât make anythingâ spoke too soon.
Luxor fixed the vulnerability within two hours and promised to reimburse customers. Its CEO described it as an âAI-assistedâ attack, without explaining how. Be cautious with that term: itâs been heard a lot this year (Coldcard in July, BTCPay in August), but evidence has been much scarcer.
The lesson goes beyond mining: when a single dashboard decides where your money goes, thatâs what you need to protectânot just your keys.
Do you ever check where your payment settings are pointed, or do you trust them as long as everything keeps running?
Proof of reserves: one true statement, one half true, one false
Four years. FTX declared bankruptcy on November 11, 2022, and since then, weâve all learned a new term: proof of reserves. Platforms display it, we nod, and almost no one clicks the âverifyâ button. I wanted to sort through what we hear about this. Three statements come up all the time. One is true, one is half true, and one is false. âI can verify for myself that my balance is included.â â TRUE This is the most underrated part. The system is based on a Merkle tree: each account becomes a digital fingerprint (a hash, like a barcode thatâs impossible to reverse). The fingerprints are grouped in pairs, then in pairs again, until thereâs just one fingerprint at the top: the root. If someone removes or modifies your account, the root changes. You only need to see your own branch, not everyone elseâs balances.
stUSDT, July 2023 â November 2026. Born on Tron ($TRX ), then moved to Ethereum. At its peak: $2.3 billion deposited in November 2023.
No hack, no announced bankruptcy. Just a message on Saturday: interest payments are stopping, and the redemption window will remain open until May 14, 2027.
The idea was simple: you deposited $USDT, the protocol invested it in short-term government bonds (âreal-worldâ assets, or RWAs for short), and your balance grew automatically every day.
What strikes me isnât the closure. Itâs the curve: $2.3B in November 2023 ~$60M a year ago $47.5M on November 13 $9.5M on November 14 ~$8.4M this weekend (DefiLlama, via CoinMarketCap)
More than 99% of the money was already gone before the announcement. And on the day itself, those who remained withdrew 80% of what was left within 24 hours.
Two details to keep in mind if you still have tokens in there: - the team says the assets remain fully backed, but hasnât given any reason for the closure; - tokens on an exchange or in a DeFi protocol? Youâll need to move them back to your own wallet first to claim. JustLend is also closing its wstUSDT market.
One last reminder that applies far beyond this case: despite its name, stUSDT was never affiliated with Tether, which denied any connection back in September 2023. A name that sounds like a familiar brand doesnât guarantee anything.
A dollar-denominated yield quietly fading away: a clean ending, or a warning sign we should have seen coming long ago?