This is indeed a big deal

The amount of the U.S. arms sale to Taiwan is reaching $11 billion, marking the largest arms trade in history. Honestly, this is really audacious. It mainly includes: - U.S. Armed Forces Tactical Mission Network (TMN) - 82 sets of M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) - 420 MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) - 120 M109A7 "Paladin" self-propelled howitzers and M992A3 ammunition transport vehicles - 1,545 tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) 2B BGM-71F-7-RF missiles - 1,050 FGM-148F "Javelin" anti-tank missiles - Harpoon anti-ship missile guidance systems and maintenance - ALTIUS-600M and 700M cruise missile systems - Spare parts and maintenance for AH-1W "Super Cobra" attack helicopters. I have highlighted what I think is most important; this is definitely not a minor issue.

The threat from HIMARS is the greatest, and there will also be supporting 227mm guided rockets GMLRS. In fact, the first batch of 29 HIMARS purchased by Taiwan has already included 864 GMLRS, an average of 30 per vehicle. Based on this ratio, 82 HIMARS would be matched with about 2,400 GMLRS. GMLRS uses GPS guidance, with a range of 40-80 kilometers. The hit rate under non-jamming conditions is 70%. In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the hit rate under strong interference from Russians can drop to 10% or lower. The batch of GMLRS sent to Ukraine is estimated to have used P codes, whereas if military codes (M codes) were used, the anti-jamming ability should be stronger. Also, the ATACMS missiles, among the 29 HIMARS transactions in Taiwan, have already sold 87 units; combined with this shipment of 420 units, the total has exceeded 500 units.

Although ATACMS has successors like the PrSM precision strike missile, the U.S. still holds over 2,500 units in total. Among them, 1,200 units are expired, but they can easily be refurbished and sold to the Taiwanese military for profit. Many people downplay the threat of HIMARS, believing that once air superiority over Taiwan is achieved, it can be suppressed. I can only say this is overly optimistic. For example, during the NATO airstrikes in the Kosovo War in 1999, NATO air forces bombed the forces and equipment deployed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo for 78 days. When the Yugoslav army withdrew from Kosovo, Western media were astonished at how little damage they had suffered. The mountainous Kosovo region has a total area of only 11,000 square kilometers, and its residents are predominantly ethnic Albanians, who were deeply hostile towards the Yugoslavs and were eager to inform NATO of their movements.

Yet, the Yugoslav army was still able to successfully hide most of its equipment using the local terrain. How can Taiwan, with plains equivalent in area to Kosovo and even richer vegetation, expect to fundamentally destroy the hidden HIMARS among them? Don't tell me NATO's equipment was poor; NATO's F-16C was already widely equipped with LANTIRN targeting pods that could be used at night and in adverse conditions. By the way, the U.S. had sold 28 sets of LANTIRN to Taiwan as early as 1996. So they are certainly not without concepts on how to use camouflage to deceive infrared systems. There is no magic solution for dealing with HIMARS. It can only be a combination of the following methods:

1. Large-scale, high-intensity, long-term electronic interference to suppress GPS signals, attempt to disrupt the Link 16 network, and damage the HIMARS command network to reduce its vehicle positioning accuracy.

2. Long-endurance reconnaissance drones for area patrol to suppress HIMARS in the region. However, this requires high satellite communication bandwidth because each drone needs to transmit the patrol video to the control center operator for real-time identification of HIMARS. The related issue is whether the current military communication satellite network has enough repeaters to accommodate this. The plain area of Taiwan is about 10,000 square kilometers, and considering the adjacent mountainous and hilly areas of the same size, a total of 20,000 square kilometers needs to be monitored. If one drone can monitor and suppress 1,000 square kilometers, then 20 drones will be required.

3. Attacking the shelters, ammunition depots, and maintenance workshops of HIMARS and other rear support facilities. This mainly relies on pre-war intelligence gathering. Once the fighting starts, it becomes difficult because the enemy can use civilian residences as logistics support sites at any time. Although these methods may achieve some effect, I believe it is impossible to completely silence HIMARS without ending the entire war. Therefore, we must be prepared to pay a considerable price, and do not harbor any illusions; be mentally prepared. Of course, if it is possible to force the Americans to halt deliveries through some coercive or sanctioning means before the HIMARS arrive on the island, that would be the best outcome. But is that possible?