Ogcrypt0

Most systems which involve making important decisions operate under trust. A bank has a belief that the KYC provider has done its task well. Employer will have faith that indeed the university awarded that degree. A government agency has faith in the fact that the contractor has done the audit it alleges to have done. The credibility is most often obtained with the help of phone calls, paper-based documents, manual verification procedures, and decades of institutional authority. It is mostly effective, but also very slow, costly and collapses entirely the moment you need to check on something beyond the borders, even between companies or on any scale.

Sign Protocol evidence layer is constructed based on another concept. Rather than requiring parties to trust each other due to the reputation and paperwork, it provides them with cryptographic evidence that a particular thing occurred, at a particular time, sanctioned by a particular party, under a particular set of rules. Such evidence does not need the verifier to be in relationship with the issuer. It does not involve the use of a phone call. It does not demand the need to wait until somebody on the other side replies to an email. The proof speaks for itself.

To see how this is important we need to think about the role evidence plays in a system. Evidence provides answers to questions, retrospectively. Who approved this? When did it happen? What was their prerogative to sanction it? Which version of the rules was then in force? A traditional system would require an answer to these questions, which involves re-creating a paper trail - retrieving emails, browsing logs, making phone calls with people who might or might not recall how things unfolded. With a system implemented based on the evidence layer of Sign Protocol the answers to those questions are provided automatically since each action leaves a record that can be verified at the time of occurrence.

The action of the mechanics operates in two primitives. The schema defines how a record looks like, what are the fields that the record has, what data types are mandatory, required, and optional. Attestations are the records per se, signed by the issuer, and they follow the schema, being on- or off-chain based on the sensitivity of the stored data. Each attestation is bound to the wallet address in which it was created. Each attestation has a time stamp. Each attestation is cryptographically bound to its issuer such that it cannot be forged nor can it be repudiated.

The key to this being an evidence layer and not a simple record keeping system is the presence of verifiability and permanance. The contents of a personal database can be modified by whoever has access to that database. An email thread record can be challenged. One can forge a record on paper. Once created, an attestation on Sign Protocol cannot be changed. Even a single changed bit in the attestation will not be validated by the cryptographic signature which the issuer signed and added to it upon its creation. It is not any kind of policy promise, but a mathematical one. This much institutional pressure does not make a hash match.

The issuer aspect of this is one to ponder over. Attestations done by an organization by Sign Protocol are statements which cannot be subsequently withdrawn. A KYC issuer who provides an attestation that a user has passed verification has left a record of such a claim forever. When such a user ends up submitting false documents, the attestation remains as an indication of what the provider certified at that point. This brings about actual responsibility. Companies making attestations are affixing their cryptographic sign to assertions and those signatures can be observed by anyone who attaches their eyes to them.

The side of the verifier is also significant. When one queries an attestation, he or she is not summoning the issuer to enquire of whether or not it is authentic. They are conducting a mathematical audit of the blockchain. The public key of the issuer is in-chain. The signature that is signed with the respective private key is included in the attestation. The authenticating algorithm verifies to ensure that the signature is valid. This only takes milliseconds and does not need any collaboration on the part of the issuer. A genuine attestation cannot be revoked at a later date, to evade responsibility, and a forged attestation will not pass verification at all.

Revocation is a voluntary aspect in this system. When an attestation must be invalidated - e.g. something went out of date, the facts on which it was based have changed, it was issued in error - the issuer can identify it as revoked. The revocation is also an on-chain event, which is permanently timed. The subsequent revocation and the original issuance will be visible to a verifier reviewing the attestation. The entire history is maintained. Nothing disappears. This is important in controlled situations that require an audit trail reflecting not only what is presently valid but what, where, and when.

This is in practice demonstrated by real deployments. On successful verification, a KYC provider provides attestations to the verified users. A DeFi protocol permits access using those attestations instead of its own KYC operation. The protocol does not require any connection with the KYC provider besides familiarity with its on-chain address. Attestation is carried by the user and presented. The signature is confirmed by the protocol. Access is granted or denied. No calls to a third party server API, no session tokens, no reliance on the uptime of the KYC provider.

The layer of evidence is even more useful in an audit. An organization that is under review by the regulators can give a full account of all actions carried out, all grants made, all rules followed, all in a form that a regulator can independently review and not have to depend on the organization to give valid summaries. The attestations are stored on-chain. The regulator has the option of enquiring them directly. This is replaced by an audit that is not in the form of a negotiation of what transpired but rather a mere checking of what is displayed by the chain.

S.I.G.N. - the sovereign infrastructure platform based on Sign Protocol - considers this evidence layer as basic infrastructure and not an option. Each money transfer, each identity check, each allocation of capital in a S.I.G.N. deployment leaves attestations behind. The evidence is present when something goes wrong or when it is to be audited. It was created when every
action took place.

Most systems which involve making important decisions operate under trust. A bank has a belief that the KYC provider has done its task well. Employer will have faith that indeed the university awarded that degree. A government agency has faith in the fact that the contractor has done the audit it alleges to have done. The credibility is most often obtained with the help of phone calls, paper-based documents, manual verification procedures, and decades of institutional authority. It is mostly effective, but also very slow, costly and collapses entirely the moment you need to check on something beyond the borders, even between companies or on any scale.

Sign Protocol evidence layer is constructed based on another concept. Rather than requiring parties to trust each other due to the reputation and paperwork, it provides them with cryptographic evidence that a particular thing occurred, at a particular time, sanctioned by a particular party, under a particular set of rules. Such evidence does not need the verifier to be in relationship with the issuer. It does not involve the use of a phone call. It does not demand the need to wait until somebody on the other side replies to an email. The proof speaks for itself.

To see how this is important we need to think about the role evidence plays in a system. Evidence provides answers to questions, retrospectively. Who approved this? When did it happen? What was their prerogative to sanction it? Which version of the rules was then in force? A traditional system would require an answer to these questions, which involves re-creating a paper trail - retrieving emails, browsing logs, making phone calls with people who might or might not recall how things unfolded. With a system implemented based on the evidence layer of Sign Protocol the answers to those questions are provided automatically since each action leaves a record that can be verified at the time of occurrence.

The action of the mechanics operates in two primitives. The schema defines how a record looks like, what are the fields that the record has, what data types are mandatory, required, and optional. Attestations are the records per se, signed by the issuer, and they follow the schema, being on- or off-chain based on the sensitivity of the stored data. Each attestation is bound to the wallet address in which it was created. Each attestation has a time stamp. Each attestation is cryptographically bound to its issuer such that it cannot be forged nor can it be repudiated.

The key to this being an evidence layer and not a simple record keeping system is the presence of verifiability and permanance. The contents of a personal database can be modified by whoever has access to that database. An email thread record can be challenged. One can forge a record on paper. Once created, an attestation on Sign Protocol cannot be changed. Even a single changed bit in the attestation will not be validated by the cryptographic signature which the issuer signed and added to it upon its creation. It is not any kind of policy promise, but a mathematical one. This much institutional pressure does not make a hash match.

The issuer aspect of this is one to ponder over. Attestations done by an organization by Sign Protocol are statements which cannot be subsequently withdrawn. A KYC issuer who provides an attestation that a user has passed verification has left a record of such a claim forever. When such a user ends up submitting false documents, the attestation remains as an indication of what the provider certified at that point. This brings about actual responsibility. Companies making attestations are affixing their cryptographic sign to assertions and those signatures can be observed by anyone who attaches their eyes to them.

The side of the verifier is also significant. When one queries an attestation, he or she is not summoning the issuer to enquire of whether or not it is authentic. They are conducting a mathematical audit of the blockchain. The public key of the issuer is in-chain. The signature that is signed with the respective private key is included in the attestation. The authenticating algorithm verifies to ensure that the signature is valid. This only takes milliseconds and does not need any collaboration on the part of the issuer. A genuine attestation cannot be revoked at a later date, to evade responsibility, and a forged attestation will not pass verification at all.

Revocation is a voluntary aspect in this system. When an attestation must be invalidated - e.g. something went out of date, the facts on which it was based have changed, it was issued in error - the issuer can identify it as revoked. The revocation is also an on-chain event, which is permanently timed. The subsequent revocation and the original issuance will be visible to a verifier reviewing the attestation. The entire history is maintained. Nothing disappears. This is important in controlled situations that require an audit trail reflecting not only what is presently valid but what, where, and when.

This is in practice demonstrated by real deployments. On successful verification, a KYC provider provides attestations to the verified users. A DeFi protocol permits access using those attestations instead of its own KYC operation. The protocol does not require any connection with the KYC provider besides familiarity with its on-chain address. Attestation is carried by the user and presented. The signature is confirmed by the protocol. Access is granted or denied. No calls to a third party server API, no session tokens, no reliance on the uptime of the KYC provider.

The layer of evidence is even more useful in an audit. An organization that is under review by the regulators can give a full account of all actions carried out, all grants made, all rules followed, all in a form that a regulator can independently review and not have to depend on the organization to give valid summaries. The attestations are stored on-chain. The regulator has the option of enquiring them directly. This is replaced by an audit that is not in the form of a negotiation of what transpired but rather a mere checking of what is displayed by the chain.

S.I.G.N. - the sovereign infrastructure platform based on Sign Protocol - considers this evidence layer as basic infrastructure and not an option. Each money transfer, each identity check, each allocation of capital in a S.I.G.N. deployment leaves attestations behind. The evidence is present when something goes wrong or when it is to be audited. It was created when every action took place.
@SignOfficial $SIGN #SignDigitalSovereignInfra

Quando inizi a lavorare con il Sign Protocol, una decisione sorge quasi subito. Quindi dove risiede l'attestazione? On-chain implica che l'intero record sia memorizzato sulla blockchain. Off-chain implica che esista in un altro luogo, solo un riferimento è posizionato on-chain. Entrambi sono validi. Entrambi non sono necessariamente migliori. La decisione corretta sarà basata sul tipo di dati che stai costruendo e su cosa sono realmente i dati.
Inizia con on-chain. Nei casi in cui un'attestazione è completamente on-chain, tutti i dati in quel record sono memorizzati nella blockchain di un singolo blocco. È permanente. È leggibile pubblicamente. Qualsiasi utente finale con l'hash della transazione o l'ID dell'attestazione può cercare immediatamente la transazione senza dover ottenere nulla da un server remoto. Non dipendono da una terza parte per rimanere online, non sono a rischio di perderla se il loro fornitore di archiviazione va offline, non hanno dubbi che i loro dati siano stati alterati. Ciò che va sulla catena è ciò che c'era, e rimarrà lì.