The growth of private labels does not necessarily represent a loss for the incumbent manufacturer; rather, it may serve as a defensive instrument to jointly preserve a dominant position over a larger share of total demand.
Recent statements by Gama’s chief executive, Lesly da Cámara, to Banca y Negocios offer a privileged window into the strategic evolution of private labels in Venezuela and their growing importance in the retail business. Far from viewing them as a mere tool for offering cheaper products, Gama’s experience seems to confirm that private labels are a sophisticated market-segmentation mechanism that makes it possible to expand the demand served, increase commercial efficiency, and create value for manufacturers and retailers alike.
According to Lesly da Cámara, private labels currently account for between 10% and 11% of Gama’s total revenue, and the company intends to keep increasing that share, bringing it closer to international standards.
Even more relevant is her assertion that many private-label products are manufactured by established Venezuelan manufacturing companies with idle capacity, which produce goods for Gama to quality standards comparable to those of leading brands, but sell them at more affordable prices. This description is particularly interesting because it shows that the relationship between manufacturer and retailer is not necessarily based on confrontation, but rather on strategic cooperation.
It has traditionally been argued that private labels pose a threat to manufacturers that own well-known brands. However, this analysis is based on an excessively static view of the market. In many cases, consumers are not a homogeneous group, but have different willingness to pay for the same product. Some consumers place significant value on the reputation, history, and trust associated with an established commercial brand, while others prioritize factors such as price, functionality, or value for money.
It is precisely in this context that private-label production can become a particularly efficient instrument of price discrimination. A manufacturer that enters into an agreement with a retailer retains the opportunity to continue serving the consumer segment with a high willingness to pay through its traditional brand, drawing on decades of investment in reputation, advertising, and positioning. At the same time, it can reach more price-sensitive segments by producing a second line marketed under the retailer’s brand.
The economic outcome is equivalent to expanding market coverage. Rather than abandoning consumers with a low ability to pay or allowing competitors to capture them exclusively, the manufacturer indirectly participates in that segment through the private label. In this way, it maintains the ability to skim the premium segment while adding another source of volume from more price-sensitive consumers.
Gama’s president’s statements seem to point precisely in this direction when she explains that competition introduced by the private label does not necessarily harm leading brands. On the contrary, she argues that when the private label gains market share and prompts a promotional response from leading manufacturers, the category’s total volume ultimately grows. This observation is consistent with a dynamic view of competition in which the private label does not merely take sales away from commercial brands, but can expand aggregate demand across the entire category.
From the retailer’s perspective, the strategy is also particularly attractive. Gama possesses an important intangible asset built over more than five decades of presence in the Venezuelan market. This reputation acts as a form of brand capital, or retailer brand equity, that can be partially transferred to products marketed under its own brand.
When consumers buy mayonnaise, a sauce, or a cleaning product bearing the Gama brand, they are not buying a completely unknown product. To some extent, they are buying the trust the supermarket has built up over the years.
This phenomenon reduces consumers’ information costs and makes it easier for them to accept the private label. As a result, the retailer is no longer merely an intermediary, but also becomes a creator of value and differentiation. The distributor’s commercial brand acts as a sufficiently credible quality guarantee to attract consumers who would otherwise continue limiting their purchases to traditional manufacturers.
The economic logic underlying these types of agreements can be interpreted as an efficient vertical alliance. The manufacturer contributes production expertise, industrial capacity, and economies of scale. The retailer contributes access to the end consumer, detailed knowledge of their purchasing patterns, prime shelf space, and a commercial brand with growing influence over consumer decisions. Both parties work together to serve specific market segments without having to give up their respective business models.
However, the sustainability of this strategy depends on one fundamental condition: cannibalization between the two offerings must remain under control. If the private label comes too close to the manufacturer’s commercial brand in terms of its value proposition, consumers could switch en masse from the premium product to the cheaper alternative, reducing the agreement’s overall profitability. Likewise, if consumers have ample opportunity to arbitrage and perceive the two options as perfectly equivalent, the ability to segment the market disappears.
For this reason, much of the success of private labels rests on mechanisms of both vertical and horizontal differentiation. The manufacturer needs to preserve specific attributes, levels of innovation, functional characteristics, or reputational elements that continue to justify a price premium for its commercial brand. At the same time, the private label must offer sufficient quality to appeal to more price-sensitive segments without completely eliminating perceived differences between the two options.
Recent experience in the Venezuelan market seems to confirm this logic. In an environment where consumers have extremely varied income levels and face significant budget constraints, the coexistence of commercial brands and private labels makes it possible to meet a much wider range of needs. The issue is not simply to offer cheaper products, but to design a market structure capable of attracting consumers with very different preferences and willingness to pay.
In this sense, the statements by Gama’s president provide particularly valuable evidence of how private labels have ceased to be merely a tactical response to periods of crisis and have become a structural component of modern retail’s competitive strategy.
Rather than posing a threat to commercial brands, private labels can be understood as an efficient segmentation tool that enables manufacturers and distributors to expand the market frontier together. As long as differentiation remains sufficient to limit cannibalization and prevent excessive arbitrage between the two offerings, the combination of an established commercial brand and a private label backed by the retailer’s reputation will probably be one of the most robust and profitable growth strategies in contemporary Venezuelan commerce.
There is also a less obvious strategic dimension that is probably more relevant in the long term. Traditionally, private labels are analyzed as a tool for consumer segmentation, but they can also be interpreted as a means of closing off the market to potential industrial competitors.
From this perspective, it could be rational for large, established manufacturers to promote production agreements with major retail chains early on, even before significant new entrants emerge. At first glance, this strategy seems paradoxical, since it involves helping develop a brand that partially competes with their own products. However, closer analysis reveals a powerful economic rationale.
When a leading manufacturer produces both its commercial brand and a private label for the retailer, it ends up covering a much larger share of the consumer spectrum. The commercial brand continues to capture the segment with the greatest willingness to pay, while the private label absorbs much of the residual demand from more price-sensitive consumers. As a result, the market space available to a potential entrant is significantly reduced.
A new manufacturer seeking to enter the category then faces a fundamental problem: high-value segments remain protected by the brand equity accumulated by the leaders, while the more price-sensitive segments are already served by private labels backed by modern retail distribution. The result is a reduction in the residual demand that could sustain the entry of new industrial competitors.
In terms of industrial organization, private labels can act as a mechanism for strategic market occupation. Far from necessarily weakening leading manufacturers, an alliance between manufacturers and distributors can strengthen barriers to entry by making it harder for new producers to find niches profitable enough to justify the investment required to enter the category.
The strategy is particularly effective when the private label is manufactured by the same producer that markets a leading brand, since this allows the company to internalize a significant portion of potential competition before it materializes. Instead of waiting for a new manufacturer to capture price-sensitive consumers, the established company participates directly in that segment through the retailer’s brand. In this way, the growth of the private label does not necessarily represent a loss for the incumbent manufacturer, but can instead serve as a defensive tool to preserve, together with the distributor, a dominant position across a greater share of total demand.
This perspective helps explain why, under certain circumstances, the growth of private labels can be compatible with the profitability of major commercial brands. Rather than a war between manufacturers and retailers, a form of vertical strategic cooperation may be emerging, aimed at segmenting consumers, increasing sales volumes, and simultaneously raising barriers to entry for potential competitors.
Economist, UCV. Professor of Microeconomics, Pricing Policy, and Digital Economy Business Models at ESIC Business & Marketing School.
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